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Abstract 
We  mailed  letters  to  non-existent  business  addresses  in  159  countries  (10  per  country),  and 
measured whether they come back to the return address in the US and how long it takes.  About 
60%  of  the  letters  were  returned,  taking  over  6  months,  on  average.  The  results  provide  new 
objective indicators of government efficiency across countries, based on a simple and universal 
service, and allow us to shed light on its determinants.  The evidence suggests that both technology 
and management quality influence government efficiency, just as they do that of the private sector. 
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I.  Introduction 
A growing literature has tried to assess empirically the quality of government in different 
countries and its determinants (e.g., La Porta et al. 1999, Treisman 2000, Svensson 2005, Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2008).  Most of this literature uses surveys of citizens, businessmen, foreign 
investors, or local experts to measure the quality of government.  While useful, survey responses 
capture the respondents’ combined assessment of government policies, corruption, and productivity 
(Glaeser et al. 2004).   As a consequence, both government efficiency and its political correlates and 
determinants  influence  survey  indicators.    In  this  paper,  we  propose  a  direct  measure  of  the 
government’s  productive  efficiency  coming  from  a  universal  public  service,  mail  delivery.   
Measuring efficiency in this way allows us to also examine its “production function” determinants, 
such as capital, labor, technology, and management.   After all, public institutions such as courts, 
police, and the postal service are in effect organizations, and as such their productivity might be 
shaped by the same factors as that of firms.  Unlike some of the earlier work (e.g., Verba and Nie 
1972, Barro 1999, Reinikka and Svensson 2004, 2005, Olken 2007, Ferraz and Finan 2008, 2011, 
Djnankov  et  al.  2010),  we  do  not  focus  on  broader  political  and  economic  forces  shaping  the 
government production function, such as democracy or accountability.    
Our measure of government productivity describes the performance of the mail system in 
accomplishing one simple task: returning an incorrectly addressed international letter.  Focusing on 
mail follows the suggestion by Edward Prescott in the early 1980s that postal economics is more 
central to understanding the economy than monetary economics.
1  
Between  December  2010  and  February  2011  we  sent  letters  to  non-existent  business 
addresses in 159 countries: 2 letters in each country’s largest 5 cities.  Each envelope had a typed up 
address using the Latin alphabet, as required by international postal conventions, and included a 
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return address at the Tuck School of Business in Hanover, New Hampshire, as well as a clear request 
to “please return to sender if undeliverable.”  The addresses included an existent city and zip code 
(where available), but a non-existent business name and street address.  The letter inside was a 
standard one page business letter, written in English and requesting a response from the recipient.  
We included nothing else in the letter to avoid a temptation to open and steal the content (see 
Castillo et al. 2011).     
All countries subscribe to an international postal convention requiring them to return the 
letters posted to an incorrect address.  We measured the fraction of letters that were actually 
returned, and how long it took the letters to come back from the date they were posted from 
Cambridge, MA.   We stopped keeping track of returns one year after the final postings that took 
place on Feb 4, 2011.  We do not believe this procedure aroused any concerns or delays at the US 
post offices.  We use the data to construct the share of letters we got back and how long it took to 
get them back in each of 159 countries.   
Our approach to measuring government efficiency has several advantages.  First, we are 
looking at a fairly simple and universal government service.   Although internet and Fedex have 
partially replaced mail recently, letter delivery by the postal service is still dominant (Guislain 2004).      
Mail is even more important for packages.  Second, we have data on labor, capital, and technology in 
the mail system, as well as on public sector management in a country.  Finally, by design we are 
looking at a government service where corruption plays no role.  It is actually impossible to ask the 
American sender of the letter for a bribe, since he is not available to pay it.   Furthermore, no larger 
political purpose is served by either returning the letter or throwing it out.  Studying mail thus allows 
a sharper focus on the standard production function approach to government efficiency.     
We verify that return of letters is a proper measure of government efficiency.  One might 
argue, for example, that it is efficient for poor countries not to return the letters because they have 
scarce resources that are best allocated elsewhere or because their efficiency would make it too 4 
 
costly to send the letter back.   In this regard, it is important to note that, under the Universal Postal 
Union, it is the sender country (in this case the U.S.) that pays for the return of an incorrectly 
addressed letter.  Nevertheless, we show that our measures of mail efficiency are correlated both 
with indicators of good government (democracy, accountability, low corruption) and measures of 
government efficiency obtained in other studies, such as public worker absenteeism (Chaudhury et 
al. 2006) and low quality of public goods (La Porta et al. 1999).       
We model the return of an incorrectly addressed letter using a standard production function 
that uses labor, capital, technology, and management as inputs.  We have data on capital, labor, and 
technology in the postal system.  For management, we have put together cross-country data on four 
aspects  of  management  quality:  professional  or  “Weberian”  bureaucracies  (hereafter  WB)  as 
defined by Evans and Rauch (1999), public sector wages, public sector employees’ attitudes toward 
their jobs, and quality of private sector management.  According to Weber (1968), professional 
bureaucracies are needed to accomplish social goals.  Evans and Rauch developed WB indices based 
on expert surveys for 35 countries, covering such aspects as skill and merit based as opposed to 
patronage-based hiring, career employment, civil service protection, and relative pay.   Dahlstrom, 
Lapuente, and Teorell (2011) have updated and refined these measures for over 100 countries in our 
sample,  so  we  can  examine  the  influence  of  WB  on  postal  efficiency,  holding  resources  and 
technology constant.   
We  supplement  WB  indices  with  three  other  approaches  to  measuring  public  sector 
management.  First, one reason for poor public sector performance may be low relative wages, 
which keep away talent and discourage initiative.  Compensation is in fact part of WB indices.  We 
assemble additional data on relative public sector wages, including for 25 countries those of postal 
employees, and consider their influence on postal efficiency.   Second, Dahlstrom et al. (2011) also 
collect data on objectives and attitudes of public sector employees.  We examine the relationship 
between  these  attitudes and  postal  efficiency.    Third,  recent  research  shows  that  management 5 
 
quality is a key determinant of productivity in the private sector (Bloom et al 2007, 2010a,b, 2012, 
2013, Gennaioli et al 2013).   We use survey measures of management quality in the private sector, 
but also Bloom/Van Reenen measures of management practices for a small sample.   
  To briefly summarize the results, we find enormous variation across countries both in how 
many letters come back, and how long it takes them to come back.   About 30% of the variation is 
explained by postal system inputs and technology, but the rest remains unexplained.   Indices of 
Weberian  bureaucracy,  particularly  meritocratic  recruitment,  are  also  statistically  significant 
determinants  of  postal  productivity,  while  relative  public  sector  wages  are  not.    Private  sector 
management quality helps explain mail efficiency across countries; some of the same aspects of 
management in the public and private sectors seem to matter.    
  In  the  next  section,  we  present  our  data.    We  also  check  that  our  indicators  of  postal 
efficiency are plausible measures of the quality of government.  Section III presents the basic results 
on the determinants of mail efficiency.  Section IV describes robustness checks.  Section V concludes. 
    
II.  Procedure and Variables 
We sent 2 letters to each of the 5 largest cities in 159 countries.  These were airmail, first 
class letters, with correct international postage of 98 cents.  The letters were dropped in street mail 
boxes in Cambridge, MA between December 8, 2010 and February 4, 2011.   Both the letter inside 
and the information on the envelope used the Latin alphabet and the Arabic numerals, as required 
by the postal convention.  The letter inside, reproduced in Figure 1, was always the same, and 
written in English.  It came from Rafael La Porta at Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College in 
Hanover,  New  Hampshire.    The  letter  stated  that  it  was  confidential,  confirmed  the  receipt  of 
previous correspondence, and requested urgent response regarding the recipient’s willingness to 
continue the collaboration project.  The idea of such a letter was to add a bit of urgency to the task 6 
 
of returning in the event that a postal employee opened the envelope and read it.  At the same time, 
we made sure there was only one piece of paper inside the envelope to minimize the temptation for 
postal employees to look for valuables inside (Castillo et al. 2011).  
The name of the addressee was chosen as a common name in the country.   In addition to 
the name of the addressee, each address on the front of the envelope had a generic name of a 
business,  such  as  Computer  Management  Professionals,  Smart  Computer  Services,  Inventory 
Technology Partners, Professional Management Forum, Inventory Area Management Computer, etc.   
Following  the  name  of  the  business,  the  envelope  had  a  printed  address,  which  had  a  correct 
existing zip code for the city in question but a non-existent address.  Names of Nobel Laureates in 
Economics and famous Western composers were used as street names.  It is possible but extremely 
unlikely that, by coincidence, the street address existed in that city at that zip code.  For all practical 
purposes, the street address was  non-existent.   The  addresses were  typed  following  the  postal 
convention.  Online Appendix K describes in detail the methodology of the experiment, provides the 
sources files, and presents the front of the envelope for several of the returned letters.  
There is a specific reason we used incorrect street names.   Had we used existing street 
names (which would be trivial), the letter would probably reach the mailman.  Unless we used a 
crazy building number, the printed address would actually exist.  In this case (as often happens in the 
U.S.), we would expect the mailman to actually deliver the letter to the existing address, so we could 
not distinguish throwing the letter out from delivering it to a non-existent addressee.  To compute 
our measures of mail efficiency, we thus need a non-existent street, so that it becomes obvious at 
some point that the address is incorrect.   
In addition, each letter contained the return address of Rafael La Porta at the Tuck School of 
Business at Dartmouth.  Under the address, it said in larger bold letters PLEASE RETURN TO SENDER 
IF UNDELIVERABLE.  This too was done to encourage the return of the letter.   7 
 
All of the countries in the sample subscribe to the Universal Postal Union.   Article 147 from 
the Universal Postal Union Letter Post Regulations Final Protocol of 2009 regulates the return of 
incorrectly  addressed  mail,  and  in  particular  mandates  the  return  of  such  mail  under  normal 
circumstances    (our  letters  did  not  contain  biodegradable  or  radioactive  material,  etc.).      The 
Regulations also require that the letters must be returned within a month of entering the country, 
and that the sending country (i.e., the US) pays for the return (Articles RC 139.9, 202.1, and 202.2).   
The  letters  met  all  the  requirements,  such  as  how  the  addresses  were  typed,  postage,  return 
addresses, letter weight, to trigger the return under the Universal Postal Union. 
Following the mailing, we kept track of the dates of return of the letters, checking every 
weekday when mail was delivered.  Based on this information, we constructed three variables for 
each country.  The first is the fraction of the 10 letters that were returned.  The second is the 
fraction of 10 letters that were returned within 3 months, as would be (generously) required by 
postal  conventions.    The third  is  the  average  time  to  get the  letter  back  using  the  (equalizing) 
assumption that the letters than never came back actually did come back on February 4, 2012, the 
last day we kept track of the data.  Appendix A provides a detailed description of all the variables we 
use in the paper.  Table 1 illustrates the construction of the mail variables for two countries: Czech 
Republic  and  Russia.    The  10  letters  for  each  country  were  mailed  on  separate  days  between 
December 2010 and February 2011.  All the letters from The Czech Republic were returned within 90 
days, with the average number of days for return of 52.3.  None of the letters from Russia came back 
by February 4, 2012, which gives Russia the average number of days of 418.8.  
Table 2 presents some statistics for our three mail variables, and lists the countries with the 
highest and the lowest share of returned letters.  On average, we got 59% of the letters back (i.e., 6 
out of 10 per country), although only 35% of the sent letters came back within 3 months.  We got 
100% of the letters back from 21 out of 159 countries, including from the usual suspects of efficient 
government such as Canada, Norway, Germany, and Japan, but also from Uruguay, Barbados, and 8 
 
Algeria.  At the same time, we got 0% of the letters back from 16 countries, most of which are in 
Africa but also including Tajikistan, Cambodia, and Russia.  For high income countries, we got almost 
85% of the letters back, and 60% within 3 months, while for low income countries these numbers fall 
to 32% and 9%, respectively.   Table 2 also shows that more of the letters came back, and they came 
back quicker, from higher education than from lower education countries.  Despite our focus on a 
very simple task, government efficiency measures vary enormously across countries, and in ways 
roughly related to per capita income and human capital, consistent with the evidence on subjective 
indicators of the quality of government (La Porta et al 1999, Treisman 2000).
2  
As a first step, we need to establish that our measures of returned mail are indeed valid 
proxies for the quality of government.  In the age of internet and Fedex, it may be efficient to 
downsize the post office.  Moreover, it might be efficient to allocate scarce resources away from 
marginal activities, such as returning letters sent from abroad to incorrect addresses.  If these views 
are valid, then the failure to return the letter is a proxy for high rather than low quality government.  
  In this regard, we make several points.   To begin, despite the growth of internet and private 
package deliveries, the demand for postal services has if anything grown over time.   It is true that 
letter delivery is down about 10% over the last two decades, but parcel deliveries are up sharply 
(UPU 2011).  Even with a decline in letter deliveries, in rich countries the postal service still delivers 
over 200 letters per person per year.   The sector remains large in terms of employment as well.        
  With regard to the marginality of returning mail sent from the U.S., we note three points.   
First, each country in our sample has signed a postal convention agreeing to do exactly that.   Failure 
to  return  the  letter  thus  constitutes  a  violation  of  an  international  agreement.    Second,  that 
convention also mandates that the sending country, i.e., the U.S., pays for the return of the letter.   
The cost of the return is thus covered for the receiving country.  And third, one might in fact argue 
                                                           
2 The coefficient of variation in our measures of postal productivity is 1.80 for getting the letter back, and 1.11 
for getting it back in 30 days (see Appendix A).   For comparison, the coefficient of variation for GDP per capita 
is .90.   Postal productivity is as variable across countries as the more traditional indicators of development.     9 
 
that returning letters addressed to businesses and sent from the U.S. is one of the most productive 
activities a postal service can do in a developing country. 
  Table 3 offers some evidence broadly inconsistent with the idea that returning mail is an 
indicator of poor rather than good government performance.   Table 3 correlates our measures of 
government efficiency with a large number of standard measures (see La Porta et al. 1999, although 
here we use the most recent numbers).
3  Two points emerge from Table 3.  First, on nearly every 
measure,  it  is  “better”  governments  – more  democratic,  more  accountable,  less  corrupt –  that 
perform better on returning letters, even if we hold per capita income constant.   That is, the 
governments more responsive to their citizens have higher efficiency indicators according to our 
measures.      If  one  believed  that  the  better  governments  would  curtail  the  mail  service,  or  its 
marginal aspects such as returning letters from abroad, one would expect exactly the opposite (see 
Djankov et al. 2002).   Second, our indicators of mail efficiency are also positively correlated with 
other  indicators  of  government  performance,  such  as  teacher  attendance  (as  opposed  to 
absenteeism), efficiency of exporting and importing as measured by the Doing Business Report, 
Regulatory Quality, and so on.  Again, if good postal performance was an indication of a failed 
government, we would expect precisely the opposite.
4   
In sum, both the broad facts about the economic and legal framework of mail delivery, and 
the basic correlations with other indicators of the quality of government, suggest that we have a 
valid measure of government performance.   Returning incorrectly addressed letters, and doing so 
faster, are indicators of higher efficiency.  We next examine the determinants of mail efficiency. 
                                                           
3 Nick Bloom has suggested that, since we send 2 letters to each city, we can use data about return of one as 
an instrument for return of the other, to correct for measurement error. We have done that, and found that R-
squared of regressions of our mail efficiency variables on the quality of government variables in general rises 
(Online Appendix B1).  The results also hold if we control for per capita income (Online Appendix B2).  In fact, a 
variety of regression tests of the format used by Djankov et al. (2002) show that better governments have 
higher postal efficiency, controlling for technology and factor inputs.    
4 Benmelech and Bergman (2013) show that the measures of mail efficiency presented in this paper are highly 
correlated with measures of efficiency of utilization of aircraft across countries, regardless of whether the 
airlines are private or public.   Theirs is independent corroborating evidence of validity of our measures. 10 
 
III.  Determinants of Mail Efficiency 
  In this section, we estimate a “production function” for the number of returned letters R, 
assumed  to  take  the  form  R  =  A*F(K,L,S),  where  A  is  total  factor  productivity  as  shaped  by 
technology and management, K is capital, L is labor, and S is the number of incorrectly sent letters.  
We interpret our experiment as measuring the increment in returned letters caused by an increment 
in incorrectly sent letters, i.e. dR/dS where dS equals 10.  We assume the following functional form: 
  =      ℎ      ,            ∗    ∗      ∗Ln(S) 
 
[1] 
This production function has two key economic properties: (1) constant returns to scale in K and L, 
and (2) increasing the number of incorrectly sent letters S increases the number of returned letters 
R.
 5   From (1), the empirical counterpart of the fraction r of the 10 letters returned is given by dR/dS: 
r∗   =   ∗    ∗       [2] 
Intuitively, multiplying r by S captures the idea that the marginal product of the postal service r falls 
as S increases because of congestion.  Ignoring this effect would understate the contribution of K 
and L to productivity if K and L are positively correlated with S. 





  = constant + a ∗ technology + b ∗ management + α ∗ Ln 
K
L
  + ε 
[3] 





  = constant + a ∗ technology + b ∗ management + α ∗ Ln 
K
L
  + ε 
[4] 
We also estimate equation [4] replacing r by r90, the share of letters returned within 90 days.   
                                                           
5 Alternatively, one could adopt a Cobb Douglas form:    =   ∗    ∗     *  , where 0 < α < 1 and β 
< 1.  This would yield r∗      =   ∗   ∗    ∗     , which approximates equation [2] for β close to 0. 
 11 
 
We also seek to adjust the output of the postal service for quality differences as reflected by 
the delay in returning letters to the US.  To this end, we define q as: 
q =
∑ 423 − t 
423
  




   
where ti  is how long it takes for letter i to return to the US and 423 is the maximum value of  ti  in our 
data.  Equation [5] states that while a letter that is returned instantaneously contributes one unit to 
the output of the postal service, a letter that is returned in 423 days or later (or never) contributes 
nothing.  In our empirical analysis, we use [5] to estimate a production function based on quality-




  = constant + a ∗ technology + b ∗ management + α ∗ Ln 
K
L
  + ε 
[6] 
The dependent variable in equations (4) and (6) is essentially the log of output per worker, 
where r, r90, and q come from our experiment.  To estimate equation (4), we need measures of S, 
technology, management, K, and L.   Since we do not have measures of management specific to the 
postal service, we begin by estimating (4) without management.   All the variables are defined in 
Appendix A.  Since we do not have a direct measure of incorrectly addressed letters, we assume that 
S is proportional to the total number of letter-post items posted in a country.   K is the number of 
letter boxes (i.e., receptacles situated in the street or at the post office for the posting of mail).  We 
have tried other measures of K, as described in the robustness section.  L is the number of full-time 
staff of the postal system.    
Our first  proxy for “technology” is the use of the Latin alphabet in a country, on the theory 
that even though each country is obliged by the postal convention it signed to accept (and return) 
letters with addresses spelled in Latin alphabet, the task of doing so is more difficult in a country 
where Latin alphabet is not used.  The second measure of “technology”, also aimed to capture the 
difficulty of returning the letter, is the log of the geographical distance between the country’s most 12 
 
populous city and Hannover, NH in the U.S.  The third, and clearest, measure of technology is the 
sophistication of postcode databases.  The variable equals 1 if postcode database includes street 
names, in which case the non-existence of the street name, and therefore the incorrectness of the 
address, would pop out immediately as soon as the envelope is machine read.   The variable equals 0 
if the postcode database only includes the names of localities, in which case the envelope-reading 
machine would not detect the wrong address at all, and a person is needed to do it.  There are two 
intermediate values as well (see Appendix C for a precise description).   This variable captures the 
basic technological difference among countries in the processing of letters.   
The results of estimating equation (4) and (6) are presented in Table 4.  The estimates of α 
vary across measures of postal output, but capital share is positive.  The capital labor ratio has a 
large effect on the efficiency of the postal service; a one standard deviation increase in the log of 
letter boxes per staff, equivalent to the difference between Georgia and Norway, is associated with 
an increase of about 55% in output per worker as measured by rS/L, 94% in r90S/L, and 63% in qS/L.  
The use of Latin based alphabet is insignificant, although distance from the US is significant in some 
specifications, and with the expected sign.  In countries further from the US, postal output is lower 
other things equal.  Most interestingly, post-code databases, the pure measure of technology, are 
consistently significant.   Technology is not only statistically significant but also has a dramatic effect 
on  postal  efficiency:  a  one-standard  deviation  increase  in  the  sophistication  of  the  postcode 
database is associated with an increase in our three measures of output per worker of about 155, 
210, and 129% respectively.    Together, capital labor ratio and technology explain 30% of the 
variation across countries in postal output as measured by returned letters per staff.
6     
Since we do not have direct measures of management in the mail service, we measure 
management in several ways.  We begin with objective measures of the professionalism of public 
bureaucracy.  We supplement these measures with survey evidence on the attitudes of public sector 
                                                           
6 We have rerun the regressions in Table 4 using logistic and Tobit specifications.  The results are very similar.   13 
 
employees, as well as with data on public sector wages.   We then turn to indicators of the quality of 
private sector management, and examine their relationship to postal productivity.    
The idea that a professional bureaucracy with non-political rules of recruitment, promotion, 
and compensation of employees delivers public goods better than a politicized bureaucracy goes 
back to Weber (1968).  Evans and Rauch (1999) measured such Weberian bureaucracy (WB) in 35 
countries using expert surveys.  They distinguished three aspects of WB: meritocratic recruitment, 
predictable career ladders, and compensation practices.  Dahlstrom, Lapuente, and Teorell (DLT, 
2011) significantly extended Evans and Rauch’s work by both revising their variables and expanding 
the number of countries, while still collecting information from country experts.   We use DLT data. 
  DLT’s WB index consists of 9 components, divided into three categories: professional and 
non-political administration, closed public administration, and salaries.   The first category covers 
merit-based as opposed to political hiring.  Experts answer four questions in this area: whether skills 
and merit decide who gets the job when recruiting, whether political connections decide who gets 
the job, whether political leadership hires and fires senior public sector officials, and whether senior 
public sector officials are hired from the ranks of the public sector.   The second category describes 
whether public administration is closed, i.e., employs lifetime workers governed by special rules and 
practices.    Finer  (1997)  distinguishes  two  approaches  to  organizing  a  bureaucracy:  the  open 
bureaucracies with employees moving between public service and the private sector, adopted for 
example  in  the  UK,  Netherlands,  and  Denmark,  and  closed/protected  career  bureaucracies  of 
France, Germany, and Spain.   Experts answer three questions: whether public sector employees are 
hired via a formal examination system, whether if recruited they stay in the public sector for the rest 
of their careers, and whether terms and contracts in the public sector are regulated by special laws 
not  applying  to  the  private  sector.      The  third  category  deals  with  salaries,  and  includes  two 
questions:  whether  senior  officials  have  salaries  comparable  to  those  of  similar  private  sector 
managers, and whether salaries of public sector workers are linked to performance appraisals.  In 14 
 
DLT data, each expert answers each question on 1 (hardly ever) to 7 (almost always) scale, and DLT 
average the answers across experts in each country.  DLT also construct a WB index that averages 
answers to the 9 questions (with higher values representing more “Weberianism”).  The correlation 
between their WB index and Evans and Rauch’s (1999) for the common 35 country sample is .67.   
  DLT supplement these questions on Weberian bureaucracy by questions about the attitudes 
and objectives of public employees, a topic also stressed by Weber (1968).  In particular, they ask 
whether public employees strive to: 1) be efficient, 2) implement policies designed by top politicians, 
3) help citizens, 4) follow rules, 5) fulfill the ideology of parties in government.   In addition, DLT 
construct  an  index  of  impartiality  of  public  employees  focusing  on  whether  kickbacks,  bribes, 
discrimination, or personal connections influence their decisions.  They also separately ask whether 
public employees act impartially when implementing a policy in a case.  We use these assessments 
both to check whether a higher WB leads to more pro-social objectives and attitudes of public 
employees, and as alternative indicators of management quality in the public sector.  Appendix D 
presents cross-country correlations between various aspects of Weberiansim of the bureaucracy.   
  Tables  5-8  add  WB  indicators,  public  sector  salaries,  and  bureaucratic  attitudes  as 
determinants of postal efficiency to the Table 4 specification.  We focus on the measure of postal 
output  per  worker  derived  from  the  share  of  letters  that  were  returned;  the  results  for  other 
dependent variables are presented in Appendix E.  In Table 5, we use three Weberian indicators: the 
WB index defined as the average answer to the 9 questions summarized in Table 5, the average 
answer  to  the  four  questions  on  professional  and  non-political  public  administration 
(professionalism  sub-index),  and  the  average  answer  to  three  questions  about  closed  public 
administrations  (closedness  sub-index).    We  also  use  the  individual  Weberianism  measure  that 
seems most closely related to bureaucratic quality: an indicator of whether public employees are 
hired  for  skills  and  merits.    Finally,  we  use  as  an  independent  variable  “public  management 
performance” from a German data source on the performance of political decision makers.    15 
 
  In  Table  5,  capital  labor  ratios  are  either  marginally  statistically  significant,  or  even 
insignificant,  and  the  coefficient  α  falls  to  the  .2  to  .5  range.    Distance  from  the  US  remains 
statistically insignificant for this measure of productivity, while postcode databases remain highly 
significant.  In contrast, measures of Weberian Bureaucracy are consistently statistically significant 
and quantitatively large.  For example, output per worker rises 108% for a one standard deviation 
change in the overall Weberian public administration index, equivalent to the difference between 
India and Japan.  The Weberian variables that are part of the sub-index of professional and non-
political public administration have higher statistical significance and an impact almost twice as large 
as that of the variables in the closed administration sub-index:  a one standard deviation increase in 
professional & non-political public administration raises output per worker by 94%, while a one-
standard deviation increase of closed administration raises output per worker by 49%.  The inclusion 
of the WB variables raises the explanatory power of the regressions by about 8 percentage points.  
Finally, a one standard deviation rise in public administration performance, equivalent to the jump 
from Mexico to South Korea, raises output per worker by 112%.  Taken at face value, the impact of 
the management variables on postal efficiency is huge.    
  Table 6 turns to the attitudes of public sector employees.  As in Table 5, the measures of 
public employee attitudes are consistently statistically significant, and with expected signs.  These 
results provide additional support for the proposition that the quality of public sector management, 
as  proxied  for  by  bureaucratic  rules  or  attitudes,  predicts  public  sector  productivity.  The  two 
variables with the largest positive economic impact from this table are public employees striving to 
help  citizens  and  public  sector  employees  acting  impartially  when  implementing  policy.    A  one 
standard deviation increase in public employees striving to help citizens, equivalent to the distance 
between Philippines and Canada, leads to a 109% increase in output per worker.  Similarly, a one 
standard deviation increase in public employees impartiality when implementing policy, equivalent 
to the distance between Estonia and Canada, leads to a similar 110% increase in output per worker.  
Interestingly,  a  one  standard  deviation  increase  in  public  sector  employees  striving  to  fulfill  the 16 
 
ideology of the governing party, equivalent to the difference between Canada and Mexico in this 
variable, leads to a 51% decrease in output per worker.  
Table 7 shows, in contrast, that neither the comparability to the private sector wage variable 
from DLT, nor the two relative public sector and postal service wage variables we added to the data 
set, help explain postal output.  The result that relative wages of public officials are not important in 
predicting productivity is consistent with earlier findings of La Porta et al. (1999) and Evans and 
Rauch  (1999).    On  the  other  hand,  there  is  some  evidence  that  linking  public  sector  wages  to 
performance appraisals increases postal performance, although this is probably best interpreted as a 
quality of management rather than a wage level variable.  
  An  alternative  approach to measuring management  quality  is  to  consider  private  sector 
management.  If economic development leads to improvements in management quality, we should 
see this in both public and private sectors.  This approach also provides an independent check on our 
evidence for the Weberian hypothesis.   After all, the issue in returning the mail is how to get a 
postal employee to actually do his job or putting the incorrectly addressed letter into a correct 
(return) container, rather than throw it out.  This seems to be fundamentally a management task of 
monitoring employees (it is hard to see how incentives would work).    
We  consider  two  groups of management  variables.    First,  we  found  three  survey-based 
cross-country measures of management quality: will to delegate authority, innovation capacity, and 
quality  of  management  schools.    Second,  for  20  countries,  we  have  the  Bloom/Van  Reenen 
management practices index, as well as the three sub-indexes of monitoring management, targets 
management, and incentives management.  Appendix D presents the correlations between nine 
Weberian questions from DLT and the seven quality of private management indicators we found.   A 
bit  remarkably,  measures  of  professionalism  of  public  administration  are  strongly  positively 
correlated  with  the  cross-country  indicators  of  the  quality  of  private  sector  management.    In 
addition, private sector management quality is highly correlated with salaries of public employees 17 
 
being linked to performance.  On the other hand, there is no relationship between closedness of 
public administration and private sector management quality.   These correlations suggest that, in 
general, similar management practices shape efficiency in both public and private sectors.  
  Table 8 presents the results for private sector management and mail efficiency.  With the 
exception  of  Incentives  Management  from  Bloom/Van  Reenen,  all  the  indicators  are  highly 
statistically significant.   The magnitude of the effect on postal output per worker of increasing the 
private  management  variables  is  also  important.    Increasing  will  to  delegate  authority  by  one 
standard deviation, or the difference between South Africa and Canada, leads to a 77% increase in 
output per worker.  The quality of management schools has the largest economic impact in this 
table: a one-standard deviation increase, equivalent to a move from Malaysia to Canada, raises 
output per worker by 118%. For the smaller sample of countries, increasing the Bloom/Van Reenen 
management practices index by one standard deviation, the difference between Mexico and Canada, 
leads to an increase in postal output per worker of 67%.  The estimates show that monitoring 
management  subindex  has  the  strongest  impact  on  postal  output  per  worker  among  the 
management practice variables: a one standard deviation increase in monitoring management is 
associated with a 78% increase in output per worker.  Targets management has the smallest impact 
on postal output per worker but still a one-standard deviation increase in this variable is associated 
with an increase in output per worker of approximately 59%.  Professional management in both 
public and private sectors are key determinants of mail efficiency.  
In summary, measures of management quality in the public and private sectors, obtained 
from very different sources, help explain the variation in postal productivity across countries, just as 
they do for private sector productivity.   We next discuss the robustness of these results.   
 
IV. Robustness 18 
 
Our results on management are cross-sectional, and as such cannot be interpreted as causal.  
Omitted country characteristics could influence both management quality and postal efficiency.   In 
a cross-section, we found it difficult to come up with a plausible instrument satisfying the exclusion 
restriction.    Alternatively,  we  examine  the  robustness  of  our  findings  to  the  inclusion  of  some 
additional controls.   
These  controls  can  be  divided  into  two  categories.    First,  there  are  geographic,  legal, 
political, and social controls that are specific to the possible efficiency of the mail system.  We have 
conducted a large number of these checks, and present the results in Online Appendices F, G, H and 
I. While the extra controls are significant on occasion, they do not alter our basic findings on the 
importance of technology and management for mail efficiency.  Here are the checks we have done. 
We have considered an alternative measure of capital stock, the number of permanent 
offices per capita (Appendix F). The coefficient on capital labor ratio is lower for this variable, and is 
not statistically significant.  However, technology and management remain consistently significant.  
Next, we have verified that state monopoly on some postal activity does not affect our results.  We 
have  also  examined  several  geographic  and  population  controls  related  to  mail  specifically, 
distribution area, population density of a country, a dummy for the country being landlocked, and 
some measures of cost and fee adjustment based on geography that are produced by the Universal 
Postal Union.  Some of these measures are significant and add modest explanatory power, but their 
inclusion does not alter our main results (Appendix G).  As additional controls, we have considered 
many standard determinants of the quality of government, such as legal origins, latitude, trust, 
religion, ethnic heterogeneity, and GDP per capita (La Porta et al. 1999).   Religion is noteworthy on 
this  list  because  Moslem  countries  might  be  hostile  to  the  US  and  not  return  the  letter.  
Nonetheless, these variables do not alter our results for technology and management (Appendix H).  
We  have  also  tried  to  take  advantage  of  geographic  diversity  of  our  addresses  within 
countries.  Generally speaking, letters come back faster and more consistently from capital cities, 19 
 
but otherwise we did not find much.  There is no evidence, in particular, that letters come back 
faster from richer places within countries.    
A tougher set of robustness checks includes variables such as a country’s education, tax 
capacity, or even GDP.   These indicators may proxy for determinants of productivity other than 
management.  For example, education might influence productivity through employee attitudes, yet 
be correlated with management.   Tax capacity could proxy for the quality of postal inputs that we 
do not pick up, technology, or management (see for example Besley and Persson 2009).   
Critically, there is a major risk of over controlling in such specifications.   For example, 
suppose that more developed or better educated countries are more productive in part because 
they have better management, as shown empirically by Gennaioli et al. (2013).  If our management 
input is measured with error, as it almost surely is, then including indicators such as education or 
GDP per capita might eliminate and reduce the significance of our management variable not because 
management does not matter, but because it is measured with error.  Similarly, tax collections to 
some extent reflect how well the government is managed.     
Appendix  I  shows  the  results  of  adding  to  the  regressions  with  statistically  significant 
variables in Tables 5-8 one at a time the log of GDP per capita, years of education of the population, 
years of college of the population, and tax revenues over GDP as a measure of fiscal capacity.  We 
find that per capita income and college education in the population reduce the size and occasionally 
eliminate the statistical significance of management variables.  But even with these enormously 
powerful  catch-all  controls,  most  management  variables  remain  statistically  significant.    Other 
controls, such as years of schooling and fiscal capacity, do not reduce the influence of management 
variables.    So,  while  we  cannot  conclusively  establish  the  causal  influence  of  management  on 
productivity,  the  evidence  is  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  management  is  the  pathway 
explaining cross-country variation in public sector productivity.   20 
 
V.  Conclusion 
  This paper has made two contributions.  First, we constructed new objective measures of 
government efficiency in 159 countries, based on return of incorrectly addressed international mail.  
These  measures  correlate  with  other  indicators  of  the  quality  of  government,  yet  have  the 
advantage that we know precisely what goes into them.  
  Second, we used these measures to argue that low public sector productivity is in part 
explained by the same factors as that in the private sector: poor technology and poor management.  
We document that a range of management variables, such as indicators of professionalism of the 
bureaucracy,  attitudes of public  sector employees, and  private  sector management  quality  help 
account for differences in postal efficiency.   
Our  findings  could  shed  light  on  some  fundamental  puzzles  related  to  the  quality  of 
government.  The first puzzle, illustrated by this paper, but seen in other research as well (e.g., La 
Porta et al 1999, Treisman 2000, Botero, Ponce, and Shleifer 2013) is that the quality of government 
improves as countries grow richer, even in dictatorships.  This fact is surprising if one focuses on the 
uniqueness of government and on political explanations of its improvement, but makes more sense 
once it is recognizes that government is subject to the same productivity dynamics as the private 
sector, including the central roles of capital, technology, and management.  
  The analysis suggests that even the more political aspects of poor government, such as 
corruption, could be a reflection of problems similar to those of the private sector, such as poor 
management.    Corruption,  for  example,  might  be  in  part  a  manifestation  of  the  weakness  of 
monitoring and incentive systems in less developed countries.  Perhaps our small findings on the 
post office could be developed into a broader approach to the efficiency of public and private 
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Got it back 
in 90 days
Number of days (up to 
limit of 04/02/2012)
Zdenek Dvořák  Debreuská 1 110 00 Praha 09/12/2010 07/03/2011 04/02/2012 1 1 88.00
Vaclav Veselý  Meadeská 4 602 00 Brno 09/12/2010 08/03/2011 04/02/2012 1 1 89.00
Milan Růžička  Haavelmoská 2 301 00 Plzeň-Jižní 11/12/2010 04/01/2011 04/02/2012 1 1 24.00
Petr Svoboda  Buchananova 1704 602 00 Brno 14/12/2010 04/03/2011 04/02/2012 1 1 80.00
Jiri Kučera  Frischova 7526 120 00 Praha 2 15/12/2010 03/02/2011 04/02/2012 1 1 50.00
Milos Novotný  Millerská 7400 460 01 Liberec IV-Perštýn 29/12/2010 25/01/2011 04/02/2012 1 1 27.00
Jan Sedlářek  Lewisova 4051 702 00 Moravská Ostrava 29/12/2010 08/03/2011 04/02/2012 1 1 69.00
Kazimir Svoboda  Markowitzova 6404 460 07 Liberec III 31/12/2010 31/01/2011 04/02/2012 1 1 31.00
Kazimir Pospíšil  Hayekova 7 301 00 Plzeň-Jižní  31/12/2010 02/02/2011 04/02/2012 1 1 33.00
Zdenek Pokorný  Arrowská 48 713 00 Slezská Ostrava 04/02/2011 08/03/2011 04/02/2012 1 1 32.00
Average 1.00 1.00 52.30
Roman Avdeyev Ulitsa Debreuska 8689 gorod Moskva 115487 08/12/2010 . 04/02/2012 0 0 423.00
Ivan Zhakov Ulitsa Modiglianaya 6802 Sankt-Peterburg 199178 09/12/2010 . 04/02/2012 0 0 422.00
Oleg Golikova Ulitsa Arrowlok 8547 Novosibirsk, Novosibirskaya Obl 10/12/2010 . 04/02/2012 0 0 421.00
Fillyp Zubkov Ulitsa Haavelmo ave 3 Ekaterinburg, Sverdlovskaya Obl 11/12/2010 . 04/02/2012 0 0 420.00
Dmitri Avdeyev Ulitsa Ohlinov 2 Sankt-Peterburg 199178 13/12/2010 . 04/02/2012 0 0 418.00
Oleg Skryannik Ulitsa Myrdalok  983 Nizhnij Novgorod, Nizhegorodskaya Obl 13/12/2010 . 04/02/2012 0 0 418.00
Pavel Ivanov Ulitsa Allaiska 45 Novoe Devyatkino, Leningradskaya Obl 14/12/2010 . 04/02/2012 0 0 417.00
Ivan Zhakov Ulitsa Hayeka  63 Ekaterinburg, Sverdlovskaya Obl 14/12/2010 . 04/02/2012 0 0 417.00
Eduard Zhakov Ulitsa Frischpik 402 gorod Moskva 101000 15/12/2010 . 04/02/2012 0 0 416.00
Ludvig Sobyanin Ulitsa Stiglerova 2709 Nizhnij Novgorod, Nizhegorodskaya Obl 15/12/2010 . 04/02/2012 0 0 416.00
Average 0.00 0.00 418.80
Table 1: Mail efficiency data for the Czech Republic and Russia
Panel B:  Letters sent to Russia
Panel A:  Letters sent to the Czech RepublicGot the letter back
Got the letter back in 
90 days
Avg. Number of days to 
get the letter back
United States 100% 100% 16.20
El Salvador 100% 100% 39.00
Czech Republic 100% 100% 52.30
Luxembourg 100% 100% 68.00
Finland 100% 90% 51.60
Norway 100% 90% 53.30
New Zealand 100% 90% 53.60
Uruguay 100% 90% 54.00
Canada 100% 90% 54.30
Barbados 100% 90% 57.90
------ ------ ------
Angola 20% 0% 404.00
Malawi 20% 0% 414.70
Mauritania 20% 0% 416.20
Mongolia 10% 10% 383.60
Swaziland 10% 0% 387.40
Fiji 10% 0% 388.20
Congo, Dem. Rep. 10% 0% 397.60
Tonga 10% 0% 398.70
Honduras 10% 0% 408.70
Burundi 10% 0% 410.70
Cambodia 0% 0% 413.50
Russian Federation 0% 0% 418.80
Gabon 0% 0% 418.80
Panama 0% 0% 418.80
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0% 0% 418.80
Nigeria 0% 0% 418.80
Sudan 0% 0% 418.80
Cameroon 0% 0% 418.80
Tajikistan 0% 0% 418.80
Cote d'Ivoire 0% 0% 418.80
Ghana 0% 0% 418.80
Tanzania 0% 0% 418.80
Rwanda 0% 0% 418.80
Liberia 0% 0% 418.80
Myanmar 0% 0% 418.80
Somalia 0% 0% 418.80
Full sample (159) 59.31% 35.35% 228.22




Upper middle income (38) 66.84%  43.16% 
c 196.27 
c
Lower middle income (39) 55.90%  30.26%   245.99  








Below median years of schooling (84) 46.07%  21.20%   281.65  
Panel B: Full sample means 
Panel C: Means by GDP per capita
Panel D: Means by average number of years of schooling
The table presents the data of our three mail efficiency variables: (i) got the letter back; (ii) got the letter back in 90 
days; and (iii) the average number of days to get the letter back in each country.  The number of countries in each 
group is in parentheses. Detailed definitions of each variable can be found in Appendix A. Significance levels for 
the test of difference means between the group and the rest of the sample mean are: a if p<0.01; b if p<0.05; and c if 
p<0.10.
Table 2: Measures of mail efficiency
Panel A: Top and bottom countries sorted by "Got the letter back" Variables Sources Correlation Obs. Correlation Obs. Correlation Obs.
Panel A: Governement efficiency
Bureaucratic quality (1995-2008) BERI  0.559 
a 132  0.515 
a 132 -0.574 
a 132
Extent of bureaucratic red tape Global Competitiveness Report 2011 -0.627 
a 125 -0.556 
a 125  0.622 
a 125
Teacher absenteeism hinders education a lot PISA 2010 -0.261 
b 70 -0.137   70 0.209 
c 70
Overall Ease of doing business rank Doing Business Report 2011 -0.493 
a 153 -0.495 
a 153  0.543 
a 153
Starting a business days Doing Business Report 2011 -0.324 
b  153 -0.317 
b  153  0.342 
a 153
Time to import Doing Business Report 2011 -0.532 
a 153 -0.551 
a 153  0.591 
a 153
Documents to export Doing Business Report 2011 -0.456 
a 153 -0.404 
a 153  0.458 
a 153
Enforcing contracts procedures Doing Business Report 2011 -0.316 
b  153 -0.275    153  0.309 
a 153
Paying taxes rank Doing Business Report 2011 -0.191    153 -0.236    153 0.235   153
Time firms spend meeting with tax officialas WB Enterprise Surveys -0.333    99 -0.208    99 0.281   99
Infrastructure quality Global Competitiveness Report 2011  0.436 
a 134  0.447 
a 134 -0.477 
a 134
% household with running water at home Gallup 2007  0.529 
a 128  0.567 
a 128 -0.585 
a 128
Panel B: Accountability
Disclosures by politicians required by law La Porta et al 2010  0.351 
a 148  0.381 
a 148 -0.380 
a 148
Disclosures by politicians publicly available La Porta et al 2010  0.446 
a 148  0.434 
a 148 -0.484 
a 148
Voice and accountability index (1996-2004) Kaufmann et al. 2008  0.641 
a 156  0.610 
a 156 -0.664 
a 156
Judicial independence Global Competitiveness Report 2011  0.439 
a 134  0.372 
a 134 -0.433
a 134
Democracy index (1990-2006) Polity IV  0.581 
a 148  0.562 
a 148 -0.608 
a 148
Executive constraints (1990-2006) Polity IV  0.577 
a 147  0.559 
a 147 -0.604 
a 147
Freedom of the press Freedom House 2006 -0.578 
a 157 -0.571 
a 157  0.609 
a 157
ICRG corruption index (2000-2008) ICRG  0.581 
a 132  0.571 
a 132  0.603 
a 132
% firms expect to give gifts for water connection WB Enterprise Surveys -0.384 
b 97 -0.386 
b 97  0.421 
a 97
Got the letter back
Got the letter back in 90 
days
Ln avg. number of days to 
get the letter back
Table 3: Mail efficiency and alternative measures of government efficiency and accountability
The table shows raw pair-wise correlations between mail efficiency variables and alternative measures of government efficiency (Panel A) and accountability (Panel B) for 
the full sample of countries with letters data.  The various measures of government efficiency and accountability are shown in the first column and the source of each 
variable in the second column.   For each of the three mail efficiency variables, the first column of numbers shows the pairwise correlations between the mail variable and 
each of the other variables. The second column of numbers shows the number of observations for each correlation.  Significance levels: a if p<0.01; b if p<0.05; and c if 
p<0.10Dependent variables:










Alphabet used is Latin-based 0.247 -0.671 0.249
[0.551] [0.649] [0.381]




Constant 6.201 14.269 
c 5.370
[5.088] [7.450] [3.755]
Observations 157 157 157
Adj. R-squared 0.31 0.41 0.41
Table 4: Postal office characteristics, alphabet and distance as determinants of mail efficiency
The table presents robust OLS regressions for all the countries in our sample. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses 
under each coefficient. Significance levels: a if p<0.01; b if p<0.05; and c if p<0.10.Ln letter boxes per staff 0.248 0.289 0.26 0.487
 c 0.181
[0.255] [0.268] [0.283] [0.265] [0.325]
Postcode databases 2.066





[0.911] [0.800] [0.668] [0.914] [0.888]
Alphabet used is Latin-based 0.984 0.587 0.493 1.126 -0.341
[0.681] [0.651] [0.647] [0.808] [0.624]
Ln distance from country to US -0.404 -0.426 -0.199 -0.229 -0.059
[0.348] [0.328] [0.313] [0.354] [0.557]
Weberian public administration 1.605 
a
[0.384]
Professional & non-political public 0.953 
a
administraiton [0.220]
Hired for skills and merits 0.933 
a
[0.239]
Closed public administration 0.562 
c
[0.309]
Public management performance 0.630
 a
[0.203]
Constant 1.286 3.989 2.264 0.033 1.596
[4.866] [4.872] [4.896] [5.547] [6.020]
Observations 102 103 103 103 117
Adj. R-squared 0.39 0.37 0.39 0.31 0.26
The table presents robust OLS regressions for all the countries in our sample. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses 
under each coefficient. Significance levels: a if p<0.01; b if p<0.05; and c if p<0.10.
Table 5: Public sector management quality and mail efficiencyLn letter boxes per staff 0.444 0.397 0.354 0.435 0.538 
c 0.402 0.291
[0.296] [0.282] [0.263] [0.303] [0.273] [0.315] [0.264]
Postcode databases 2.397 
a 2.587






[0.795] [0.717] [0.768] [0.747] [0.878] [0.824] [0.747]
Alphabet used is Latin-based 0.511 0.691 0.302 0.612 0.686 0.264 0.359
[0.652] [0.656] [0.633] [0.698] [0.674] [0.664] [0.649]
Ln distance from country to US -0.242 -0.155 -0.169 -0.192 -0.100 -0.057 -0.164
[0.337] [0.301] [0.294] [0.322] [0.347] [0.313] [0.311]
Public sector employees strive to be 0.738 
a
efficient [0.264]
Public sector employees strive to implement 0.913
 b
policies decided by top politicians [0.396]
Public sector employees strive to help 1.168
 a
citizens [0.262]
Public sector employees strive to follow 0.613 
b
rules [0.267]
Public sector employees strive to fulfill -0.546 
b
the ideology of the parties in government [0.230]
Impartiality of public sector employees 0.684 
a
[0.216]
Public sector officials act impartially when 1.038 
a
deciding to implement a policy in a case [0.220]
Constant 0.9166 -0.810 -0.043 0.738 3.796 0.319 1.012
[5.165] [4.876] [4.753] [5.070] [5.270] [5.280] [4.815]
Observations 103 103 103 103 103 101 103
Adj. R-squared 0.34 0.35 0.40 0.32 0.32 0.35 0.40
Table 6 : Attitudes and decision making by public officials and mail efficiency
The table presents robust OLS regressions for all the countries in our sample. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses under each 
coefficient. Significance levels: a if p<0.01; b if p<0.05; and c if p<0.10.Ln letter boxes per staff 0.547
 c 0.423 1.051
 a 1.059 
c
[0.291] [0.267] [0.331] [0.515]




[0.849] [0.834] [0.994] [1.568]
Alphabet used is Latin-based 0.842 0.512 1.023 2.153
[0.703] [0.698] [0.813] [1.779]
Ln distance from country to US -0.059 -0.221 -0.290 -0.012
[0.375] [0.357] [0.443] [0.485]
Senior officials with salaries comparable to 0.312
to salaries of managers of private sector [0.224]
Salaries of public administration workers 0.665 
b
are linked to performance appraisals [0.289]
Avg. government wage / GDP per capita 0.016
[0.123]






[3.643] [3.172] [3.980] [6.010]
Observations 103 102 84 25
Adj. R-squared 0.30 0.34 0.39 0.34
Table 7 : Public sector wages and mail efficiency
The table presents robust OLS regressions for all the countries in our sample. Robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses under each coefficient. Significance levels: a if p<0.01; b if p<0.05; and c if p<0.10.Ln letter boxes per staff 0.345 0.232 0.259 0.323 0.265 0.293 0.468 
c
[0.283] [0.293] [0.270] [0.200] [0.181] [0.218] [0.218]
Postcode databases 2.746 
a 2.214 
a 2.274 
a 0.183 0.244 0.118 0.565
[0.696] [0.706] [0.680] [0.874] [0.783] [0.982] [1.154]
Alphabet used is Latin-based -0.022 0.287 -0.106 0.544 0.250 0.599 0.742
[0.582] [0.571] [0.547] [0.513] [0.463] [0.574] [0.753]
Ln distance from country to US -0.500 -0.323 -0.227 0.078 0.019 -0.092 0.141
[0.382] [0.356] [0.355] [0.198] [0.183] [0.199] [0.303]
Will to delegate authority 0.973
 a
[0.244]
Innovation capacity  1.058 
a
[0.225]
Quality of management schools  1.388 
a
[0.222]
Management practices index  3.049 
b
[1.113]
Monitoring management  2.790 
a
[0.818]





Constant 3.931 4.187 0.730 -3.440 -1.718 0.577 -4.026
[5.129] [5.052] [4.742] [4.254] [3.877] [3.742] [6.843]
Observations 137 134 137 20 20 20 20
Adj. R-squared 0.32 0.34 0.37 0.46 0.57 0.39 0.29
The table presents robust OLS regressions for all the countries in our sample. Robust standard errors are shown 
in parentheses under each coefficient. Significance levels: a if p<0.01; b if p<0.05; and c if p<0.10.
Table 8 : Private sector management quality and mail efficiencyFigure 1 
This figure presents the text of the one-page letter that was sent to each of the 10 recipients in the largest 5 
cities in all 159 countries 
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